Alfred P. Sloan took over in 1920 amid a logjam of competitors. When he retired in 1956 GM had 52% of the market.

Some other interesting things I cam across..

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_P._Sloan

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_P._Sloan

 

Sloan's "Car for every purse and purpose" strategy was brilliant and worked very well when each division of GM was limited to three or four series with a handful of body styles and trim levels per series. And, of course, all of these vehicles were what would now be considered "full size" cars.

When the market began moving toward mid-size and compact vehicles, I think it became much more difficult to retain the "ladder of success" price structure.

When all the divisions started getting mid size cars in the early 60s, that's when the lines really began to got blurrier between Chevy and Pontiac, Pontiac and Oldsmobile, and Oldsmobile and Buick. And then when you got into the 70s and 80s and dealers from every division wanted a car off of every available platform that's when things really fell apart.

If they'd stuck to the original Sloan structure more tightly (less models per division, wider price spread between divisions) we might not be in the mess we're in now. But chances are that we wouldn't have had a lot of the most beloved cars of all time.

 

This price structure is still alive today with other companies, but they are down to 2-3 brands.

Scion - Toyota - Lexus
Ford - Mercury - Lincoln (Jaguar - Aston Martin)
Nissan - Infiniti

planned obsolescence, at least with styling is something we need to get back to.

 

GM under Sloan was also worried about being broken up by the government because of monopoly concerns in the mid 50's. Today it’s the government that has kept them in business.

I think if Mr. Sloan were alive today he'd be the first to tell GM that business models evolve over time and what worked in the 50's and 60's of many brands may not work today.

There is nothing wrong with shrinking GM back to a mainstream, midlevel and premium brand structure if they stick to the plan and have vehicles that are true to their brand but not overlapping the others. GM can get to this but it's not going to be cheap or easy.

 

What's really intresting to note Branden, is that today when you bring up GM's falling market share, the very first thing you hear is how there is more brands in the marketplace, and more intense competition.

Yet, back then (in the 1920s) when Sloan got GM's market share up to that level, there were far more brands in the marketplace then than there are today. Litterally dozens of key players.

Sure, today Cadillac has to compete with Lexus and Infiniti. But back then, there was also Packard, Pace Arrow, Duesenburg, Lincoln, and even Rolls Royce.

Today, GM is quickly headed towards a 12-15% market share (even before shedding brands).

Having a brand for every level was great marketing back when GM held over half the US marketplace. But once you get below 25% of the market and you're still serving up 7 different brands, that is an almost impossible business model to have if you plan to invest the amount of resources it takes to stay competitive.

That's the painful lesson we're seeing learned now.

 

By GM's own cutting and the american publics reluctance to give a crap about the company. I'd expect GM to continue losing share until it is liquidated. (In about 10 years)